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2INTRODUCTION
New Orleans and Liverpool were great world ports that declined precipitously in the mid
20th century, but have begun to modernize recently (in the 1970s - 1980s).  Both cities have
remnant populations that reflect their historical slave trade and unusually large merchant class.
Both cities traditionally have had low manufacturing bases, and thus had difficulty absorbing
their large pools of unemployed dock workers during port decline and restructuring to meet
containerization.  Finally, both New Orleans and the Merseyside Development Corporation have
largely pursued what has been called the “Corporate Centered Approach” to waterfront
development and urban regeneration.
In the early 1980s, Merseyside was an area of economic decline with the social problems
associated with high unemployment and low pay.  The Port of Liverpool, which had expanded
rapidly between 1850 and 1950 to become a major general cargo ports in the United Kingdom,
had started to decline in the 1960s.  Changes in cargo handling techniques and evolving transport
technologies meant that traditional impounded dock systems at Liverpool and Birkenhead became
obsolete as deep water access and the availability of large areas of land for modern berths were
required.  In addition, the U.K.’s general cargo trade became increasingly orientated towards
Europe, resulting in the growth of Southern ports at the expense of those further north.  In 1972,
the entire South Dock system was closed and investment was concentrated in the Royal Seaforth
Docks that provided modern deep-sea container berths.  The older parts of the docks fell into
disrepair, and the dock basins became heavily silted.  The decline in port activities brought wider
economic decline, since the local economy was dependent on the port and port services.  Regional
employment policies and local efforts failed to bring about any sustained restructuring of
3Merseyside's economic base.  The consequent high unemployment and social malaise resulted
in a lack of confidence in the City for investment.
New Orleans followed a similar scenario.  One only need to change the names of the
competing ports to Miami, FL, Mobile, AL, and Galveston, TX.   New Orleans was a very
wealthy southern city as recently as 1950, boasting the United State’s second largest and, by far
the busiest port on the Gulf.  Today, it lacks strong local banks, its airport is the most
underutilized in the nation and, in economic terms, it is rapidly becoming a third rate southern
city.  Indeed, it occupies third place in the U.S. poverty league of the largest cities, with 31% of
the city’s population in 1990 living below poverty levels.  There is the longstanding problem of
“white flight,” much of it to neighboring Jefferson Parish.  In the 60's, this was fueled by fears
of civil rights activism, school desegregation and Jefferson's cheap land. Crime, (the murder rate
in New Orleans is the third highest in the U.S.), has hastened “white flight” to Jefferson with its
virtuous circle of low service demands, and resulting low taxes on businesses and individuals.
Indeed, the city has lost more than 100,000 residents since the late 1970s.  Offices and retail have
often accompanied this suburbanization.  It is a fiscally and socially distressed `frostbelt city' in
a largely prosperous, growing “sunbelt” region.  National unemployment went from 8.5% (1975)
to 7.2% (1985), while in New Orleans it went from 7.2% to 11% in these years.  Unemployment
was still 10% in New Orleans in 1988, with a further 40% underemployed, mainly in tourism.
Thousands have dropped out of the labor force, having lost all hope of finding work.  The city's
proportion of  “discouraged workers” is among the highest in the nation.
There are significant contextual differences in the two cases which might suggest that
different development strategies, policies and outcomes are likely.  These contextual differences
4should be obvious to social scientists: different political systems, legal systems, government
bureaucracies and position in the world economy.  There are also fewer important differences in
the physical structure (natural and manufactured) of the port and the built environment of the city.
These similarities and dissimilarities suggested the explanatory value of a comparative case study
analysis.  A survey of the two cities' development strategies, policies, and outcomes and the
politics surrounding those strategies was most startling for its similarities: the focus on tourism,
physical redevelopment, and the tension between local democracy and political accountability
and the assumed proprietary nature of information necessary for economic decision making.  
THE TRANSFER OF LOCAL DEVELOPMENT POWERS IN THE UK1
Throughout the 1980s, urban policy in the United Kingdom had been heavily influenced
by the belief that the private sector should be the principal agent of urban change, and that
intervention by the state should be reduced.  Central government inner city policies were aimed
at creating a climate for self-sustaining growth led by the private sector.  Since 1979, about 50
separate Acts were passed, aimed at reducing the independence of local authorities (Riddell
1989).  The Local Government Planning and Land Act of 1980 specified the necessary
powers to establish Urban Development Corporations (UDC) in urban areas.  The object of a
UDC is to secure regeneration of its area "by bringing land and buildings into effective use,
encouraging the development of existing and new industry and commerce, creating an attractive
environment and ensuring that housing and social facilities are available to encourage people
to live and work in the area" (S136 Local Government Planning and Land Act 1980).  In order
to carry out this regeneration, UDCs are given broad planning responsibilities, taking over the
5development control function of local authorities, and are able to acquire public sector land by
means of "vesting orders" agreed by the Secretary of State (Adcock 1984:284).
Each urban development area requires parliamentary approval.  This procedure allows a
petition to be made to a select committee against the confirmation of the order, and so provides
a route for public participation.  The Secretary of State appoints a Board for each UDC.  Further
control is exercised through a financial regime, which includes the requirement that UDCs
specify their aims of regeneration in corporate plans, and submit individual projects for
departmental approval.  A key feature is that they should secure private funding for as much as
possible of the regeneration of their areas.
ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY: URBAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS
The central government view was that a single agency operating within a defined program
and timetable would be able to achieve regeneration and create confidence more quickly than the
local authority.  A single agency offered political stability, administrative simplicity, and speed
of implementation.  Local authorities were subject to periodic changes in policy orientation.  In
Merseyside in particular, political change had been a feature of local government for many years.
The single agency would also have an administrative advantage, having a single Board and a few
employees, and links between investors and developers would be more easily established.
Finally, the agency’s ability to deliver results quickly within a defined period was seen as
particularly  important if the dockland areas were to attract private sector investment.  The
reclamation and engineering works to be undertaken were extremely complex.  Results had to be
achieved quickly in order for the private sector to see the dockland areas as development
6opportunities.
The Merseyside Development Corporation (MDC), typical of the UDCs, is reliant on
short-term contract staff, external consultants, and a minimum number of permanent staff.
MDC’s decision-making style follows a corporate model: decisions are made by a small number
of elites within the corporation, by large private developers and financial institutions based
principally on their particular market criteria.  This is said to result in a commercially realistic and
flexible mode of planning, and it is oriented to the short term needs of their specific private
capital.  This has both advantages and disadvantages; on the one hand, it can be reactionary and
enabling, whereas on the other hand, it can be seen as disjointed.  The corporate plan is the annual
plan for the Secretary of State and forms the basis of the bid each year to allocate funds within
the MDC.  The budget is approved by the central government finance department. 
Intergovernmental Relations
Since UDC's are an arm of the central government, they could, in principle, expect
favorable treatment.  Batley (1989) argues that the UDCs have a "privileged" relationship with
central government in that their success will reflect the central government's commitment to
urban regeneration (Batley 1989:174).  This is borne out in the sense that throughout the 1980s
many local authorities, such as Liverpool, were "rate-capped," while the MDC received abundant
resources.  In addition, since disputes between the two are decided by the Secretary of State,
he/she may be expected to rule in the UDC's favor. 
Although not locally accountable, UDCs are politically accountable to Parliament,
administratively to the Department of Environment (DoE) through the Merseyside Task Force,
and financially to the Treasury (Dawson and Parkinson 1991:51).  This is consistent with the
7Government's aim of removing the political uncertainty and constraints of local government and
of democracy.  A degree of control is exerted through financial limits and through approval of
the UDCs’ annually-updated Corporate Plan and individual projects.  Furthermore, M.P.s have
the right to question Ministers in Parliament about UDCs and the Parliamentary Select Committee
may examine the UDCs expenditure and interview the Secretary of State, civil servants and
UDCs chief executives.  The UDCs also undergo scrutiny by the Auditor-General of the National
Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee.  The MDC also must submit an Annual Report
and Statement of Accounts to Parliament.  Thus, accountability to central government is quite
extensive.   
The Merseyside Task Force (MTF) provides a direct link between the MDC and the DoE.
The MTF was established in 1981 following the Toxteth riots, to provide a coordinated central
government approach to urban regeneration on Merseyside.  After an initially high profile role
dominated by the presence of Michael Heseltine—the Minister for Merseyside, the MTF acts
more like a conventional DoE Regional Office (Parkinson and Duffy 1984:93).  It now operates
on an ad hoc basis, bringing together activities appropriate for the regeneration of the local
economy (Morison 1987:109-113).  The MTF provides a means of integrating the MDC into the
network of central government initiatives, such as the Urban Programme, something that
contrasts strongly with the more distant approach taken by the LDDC regarding local authorities
and community groups (Stoker 1988:166).  The MTF is also responsible for the effective
allocation of public funds and for making recommendations to Ministers regarding MDC Board
appointments (Trewhella 1992; Molineux 1992).  However, the MTF only coordinates central
government initiatives.  Local authority initiatives remain outside its jurisdiction.  Thus, while
8there is a wide range of initiatives in Merseyside, there is no overall body to coordinate them into
a more cohesive strategy. 
The MDC receives its financing from four main sources: Grant-in-Aid from central
government (£32m for 1992); The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), administered
through the Merseyside Integrated Development Operations (£5m for 1992); the national loan
fund for commercial projects; and capital receipts from land and building sales.  This money is
administered by the MTF, which produces an annual statement for the MDC outlining how much
money will be allocated in the forthcoming year.  Furthermore, a series of `vote-heads' are used
to allocate money.  These are effectively accounting subheadings covering areas of expenditure,
such as administration and land acquisition.  Each month the MDC meets with the MTF to decide
how much they intend to spend against each vote-head.  In this way, the MDC is prevented from
holding money in a bank, thus gaining interest on public money.  The MDC is not allowed to
overspend, although it can juggle money between the various vote-heads.  Up to and including
1992, ERDF funds were deducted from Grant-in-Aid money, but beginning in 1993 this was no
longer the case.  The significance of this is somewhat overshadowed by Government expenditure
cuts.  
The MDC has delegated powers for projects up to £250,000 and for consultancies up to
£100,000, while the MTF can approve projects costing up to £3m.  Larger-scale projects require
higher authority, from the DoE for proposals between £3 and £15m and from the Treasury for
over £15m.  Further delegation for projects up to £3m is to be given to the MDC as part of new
management arrangements.  However, in a bid to avoid controversy wherever possible, any
projects that are novel, contentious or community-based, require the approval of the MTF.
9The MTF is responsible for coordinating the MDC's Corporate Planning process.
Corporate planning is central to the relationship between the UDCs and the DoE (National Audit
Office 1988: para.1.10).  The Corporate Plan details priorities and programs for the year and is
annually updated (with a 5-year expenditure summary) according to a DoE timetable.  This
culminates in the presentation of the final draft to the Minister at the annual meeting in June. It
then provides the basis for reviews and for monitoring the MDC’s progress.  The Plan is not
published, as it is described as “commercially confidential,” containing financial information and
details of sometimes "delicate" commercial negotiations (Trewhella 1992).  The approval by the
Secretary of State is required to ensure that the corporate plan fits central government objectives.
The extent to which the MDC is genuinely accountable locally remains at the discretion
of the MDC.  Theoretically, it could ignore the local authorities and pay only lip service to them.
Furthermore, unlike the local authorities, the MDC is not subject to the Local Government
(Access to Information) Act of 1985 and so available information is limited.  Monitoring
information is not published; annual financial statements, an annual report and strategy
documents are the only sources of information available to local authorities other than
consultation with the MDC itself.  Even council members on the Board are present in an
individual capacity and are forbidden to relate any secret meetings to their respective local
authorities (Parkinson and Evans 1989:22).  
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
The Initial Development Strategy of the MDC published in August 1981 specified the
broad aims of the Corporation and provided a flexible framework for public and private
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investment within its designated area:
! The MDC is charged with securing the regeneration of its area. It is to bring land
into effective use, encourage the development of existing and new industry and
commerce, and create an attractive environment with houses and social facilities
to encourage people to live and work in the area (Merseyside Development
Corporation 1981b:2).
The MDC's major function was to attract private investment through an initial outlay of public
funding.  Its major task was to create the climate of confidence necessary to attract private
investment and development into the area.  New private investment was to be attracted to
supplement the program of physical improvement necessary to deal with the effects of a declining
economy and contracting Port.  "The role of MDC is to provide reclaimed and serviced land for
other agencies, normally the private sector, to carry out development" (Adcock 1984:274).
Thus, three interrelated regeneration programs were developed to enable the MDC to fulfil
its aims: 1) Physical Regeneration - acquisition of land, assembly of sites, rehabilitation of the
docks and buildings, and the provision of roads and services. 2) Economic Regeneration—
supporting existing industries, introducing new economic activity, and working closely with the
private sector.  3) Social Renewal—to be achieved in direct cooperation with local authorities,
community and voluntary bodies—Providing housing, with special emphasis to be placed on
programs for the unemployed and in providing training for more varied and better skills
(Merseyside Development Corporation 1981b:3).
In the first three years of its life, the MDC implemented an extensive program of land
reclamation, physical construction work and servicing within its designated area.  The MDC
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improved the infrastructure in many areas of the Liverpool designated area.  Sefton Street was
improved in the early 1980s, while Riverside Drive opened in 1986 to provide a continuous link
from the inner ring road at Parliament Street to Jericho Lane.  Aigburth Road  became a major
southern link into the city center and also acted as a relief road for South Liverpool.  Local access
roads were substantially improved in the Bootle area.  In addition, St. Michael's railway station
was renovated in the mid-1980s; bus service has been improved in the area.  Throughout the
waterfront, the MDC has constructed a riverside walk and public access to the quaysides.  
By 1984, it was realized that the initial aims of the MDC concerning the generation of
industrial activity were not being fulfilled.  There had been a significant shortfall in the demand
for industrial development such that the MDC found it necessary to abandon its original
development strategy (see Appendix A for status of MDC projects).  In terms of land use, the
MDC had initially allocated 55% of its land for industrial activity, 40% for commercial,
residential and recreational activities and 5% for port-related activity (Merseyside Development
Corporation 1984).  The reorientation, in strategy, involved substituting a tourist-and-leisure-
based strategy for the original emphasis on industrial development.  This period also marked a
shift in policy increasingly toward the marketing and promotional aspects of regeneration.
During the early years, the Corporation's resources had been concentrated largely on physical
regeneration, paying little attention to its marketing strategy.  In 1984, however, a new campaign
began: one aimed at primarily creating an awareness of the changes taking place as a result of the
MDC.  This was to promote a positive image of Merseyside and to help stimulate investment
within the designated area (see Madsen 1992).
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The International Garden Festival
In 1980, the 250-acre Riverside site included the Otterspool domestic refuse tip, still in
operation and covering over 80 acres with domestic refuse to a depth of 40 feet, with derelict oil
installation depots, underground petroleum tanks and a severely eroded shoreline.  In September
1981, this area was selected by the Secretary of State to host the 1984 International Garden
Festival (IGF).  The reclamation and servicing of the entire area were completed in 18 months,
with the major Festival structures on the site were completed soon afterwards.  In all, over three
million tons of material was on the site, with over 1.7 million tons of silt, rubble and refuse being
removed.  A further 170,000 tons of domestic refuse had to be removed from the Otterspool Tip
and filled with sand before the foundations of the Festival Hall could be laid.  By 1984, the
former refuse tip was home to the Festival Hall, an arena, water features and several major
international gardens.  Overall, space was allocated for over 60 “theme gardens”— 40 of which
were British and 23 international. Large amounts of earth were moved around to create a varied
topography, and 250,000 trees and shrubs, with some trees as high as 30 feet, were planted. 
The total Riverside land reclamation cost amounted to over £13 million and was funded
as part of the MDC's program for reclamation and servicing of development land.  The capital
and operational costs of the Festival were an additional £18 million, but these were recouped
from admission charges from the 3.5 million visitors (the site needed three million visitors to
recoup the capital and operational costs), sponsorship, income from franchises, souvenirs etc.
The IGF restored much battered pride to Liverpool, demonstrating that the City could deliver a
good product on time and that, given the right sort of event and environment, Liverpool could
attract large numbers of visitors.  Furthermore, with the restoration of the Garden Festival site,
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the MDC demonstrated an approach unique in Britain to rapid reclamation and rehabilitation of
the most severely degraded and derelict land and structures that merit attention from all relevant
urban development authorities and agencies.
In 1990, 88 acres of the IGF site was acquired by Tomorrow's Leisure of Newcastle, on
a 125-year lease. Pleasure Island, as the site is now called, retained some gardens and provided
a leisure facility, incorporating activities such as roller-skating and bowling in the old Exhibition
Hall.  The rest of the land the MDC reclaimed in the Riverside area has recently been developed
as a major housing scheme. This can be divided into six distinct zones outlined in the table for
South Liverpool (See Appendix A).  By November 1992, 500 houses had been built out of the
650 or so that were planned for this residential area.
Albert Dock and Surrounds
Kings Dock is currently being used as overflow parking for Albert Dock.  Development
plans were submitted for this site in 1989, which included the construction of an Imax cinema
screen, multiplex cinema, theater, sports arena and ice rink.  Three-hundred and sixty permanent
jobs would be created.  There were, however, a number of objections to the scheme (the plans
were out of sympathy with the splendid Victorian surroundings, the scheme failed to make the
best use of the waterfront, and there were also concerns about the quality of the development),
and it was called in by the Secretary of State.  New plans were created, resulting in a delay of
four years. 
Albert Dock, built in the 1840s, is the largest group of Grade I listed buildings in the
country.  The Docks closed in 1972, and by 1980 dilapidation was already well advanced, with
bomb damage exposing the upper floors. Windows were smashed, roof damage had allowed
14
extensive water penetration and the peripheral buildings, quaysides and dock walls had fallen into
total disrepair. "The complex so close to the heart of the city centre became a depressing
monument to the decline of the Merseyside economy and the port on which it was based" (Adcock
1984:280).  After a number of proposals for the site had amounted to nothing, the MDC acquired
freehold possession of the Albert, Canning and Salthouse Docks in 1982 by agreement with the
Docks Company.  The Arrowcroft Group came forward with plans to comprehensively restore
the quayside buildings, just when Merseyside County Council introduced proposals to convert
Block D into a Maritime Museum.  Funding arrangements were shared between Arrowcroft and
the MDC, with the Corporation meeting the costs of external restoration and structural
stabilization of the buildings together with engineering works to the docks, river and quay walls
and infrastructure provision.  The Arrowcroft Group dealt with the internal conversion of the
blocks (except Block D) and quayside works.
By 1988, the five warehouse blocks, which form a rectangle around the dock, had been
restored.  The complex now houses 68 retail units (66 are let), 36 office units (33 are let), 19
costermonger carts, 130 flats, the Maritime Museum, the Tate Gallery, the Beatles Story,
Animation World, the Granada Television Studios and space for 1,500 cars.  Nearly 1,000 people
are currently employed in the Albert Dock and over six million people visit the complex every
year. The Dock is now widely recognized as the symbol of the `new' Liverpool.  The MDC
believes it had inspired business confidence in the Waterfront and City Center.
The MDC Development Strategy (Merseyside Development Corporation 1990b) outlines
the four current principal strategies for the achievement of its aims: i) The creation of a positive
perception of Merseyside.  ii) The removal of constraints to investment, primarily transport and
15
land, and removing uncertainties affecting local businesses.  iii) Improving access to
opportunities for local people, in terms of transport, skills, housing, jobs, and amenities.  iv)
Attracting inward investment from North America and the Far East as a gateway to the EC market
and from EC/EFTA countries as a gateway to the UK market.  It should be clear that since the
MDC's area expansion in 1988, there has been renewed emphasis upon commercial and industrial
development, and on the removal of constraints to development within the designated area,
although the promotional aspects of strategy have retained their importance.
LOCAL POLITICS AND THE TRANSFER
One would expect widespread local opposition to the transfer of local planning and
development powers from locally accountable councils to a central government appointed
corporation board.  This was not to be the case for several reasons.  First, local opposition was
not likely to be widespread because only two UDCs were created: London and Merseyside.  In
the Merseyside case, the area was severely depressed (80% derelict and unused).  The local
council had developed many plans for the area, but had been unable to see them to fruition (see
Appendix B) primarily because of lack of financing.  The UDC legislation promised central
government financing.  Local MP's enthusiasm for the UDC was overwhelming (Hansard
1981:511-531).  The transfer or bypassing of the local council was particularly popular for
Labour MPs because the local authorities at the time were controlled by Tory or Liberal-Tory
administrations (Meegan 1993:10).  Thus, the only local opposition that the establishment of the
MDC received was from the Merseyside County Council, abolished by the central government
in 1986.
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This initial local support was upset by the 1983 election of a radical (Militant Tendency)
Labour administration in Liverpool (see Crick 1986).  The City Council's critical stance was
quickly muffled by other political battles with the central government over rate setting and
council housing and internally with sections of the local community (see Meegan 1990).  Given
the intensity of these battles, the Council ignored the MDC even to the extent of not filling their
MDC board position between 1983 and 1989 (Meegan 1993:10).  This is not to say that local
politics did not effect the MDC's efforts to revitalize the waterfront, for according to Meegan
(1993:11), the local council's program of municipal socialism (municipal house building and
environmental and leisure development) undermined the MDC's industrial efforts by alienating
potential private sector investment (see also Parkinson 1990a).  Some have argued that this
partially explains the MDC's shift in development strategy further in the direction of
infrastructure and tourism and leisure.  These were the success stories: the International Garden
Festival and Tall Ships Race and the Albert Dock complex.
The second way that local politics affected the MDC's development strategy relates to its
conflict with the Liverpool Council, its lack of local accountability, and its enlarged area and
mission in 1988.  The expanded area included the Vauxhall area in north Liverpool.  Vauxhall
has traditionally been an area with high unemployment and a large population of Irish
immigrants.  The area has been the focus of several major urban programs, such as the 1930s
clearance that swept away many old slums in Vauxhall.  Many inhabitants stayed in the area,
moving to new walk-up tenement blocks.  In the 1960s, bold new clearance programs tore the
heart out of Liverpool to make way for the new Mersey tunnel and ring road.  Many people from
Vauxhall found themselves moved yet again, some to the new overspill estates on the outskirts
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of Liverpool like Kirby and Cantril Farm.  In 1978, LCC disclosed plans to demolish many
tenement flats, some of which were in the Vauxhall area. Local rehousing could not be
guaranteed.
It was at this point that a group of Vauxhall residents, said enough is enough and
organized themselves into the Eldonian Community Association, taking their name from a
tenement scheduled for demolition.  Their aim was to keep the community together.  The Eldonia
Community Association conducted a survey of families in Vauxhall, which showed that 80%
wished to stay in the area.  Prospects were grim since Tate & Lyle, a major local employer, had
closed.  In 1982, they formed the Portlands Gardens Housing Co-op and drew up plans to build
105 houses on five local sites.  The new Militant Labour Council of 1983 municipalized all
cooperatives.  In response, the Eldonian Housing Co-op was formed and registered with the
Housing Corporation; a longstanding conflictual relationship with Liverpool City Council was
born.  When the Thatcher Government backed Liverpool's co-ops as a way of sniping at the
Labour-controlled city council, the Eldonians made the most of the opportunity.
Michael Heseltine secured the transfer of the Tate and Lyle site and its buildings to
English Estates, the property development arm of the Department of Trade and Industry. Tate and
Lyle had to give £400,000 toward the cost of demolition.  The Eldonians were busy meeting
English Estates at their Liverpool office to secure their trust.  In late 1982, Heseltine announced
an ideas competition for the site, run and paid for by English Estates.   Liverpool City Architect
James Robb won first prize, but only because the Eldonians’ submission, with Merseyside
Improved Homes, was disqualified, for letting a local Catholic newspaper have their scheme
before the assessment. They were to get a reprieve, however, with the council being financially
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unable to realize their plans.
Despite opposition from the local council, including refusing planning permission for the
Eldonian Village in 1985, the Eldonians succeeded.  This was due in no small part to friends in
high places; not only Central Government, but senior members of the Catholic Church, who had
the ear of the Prime Minister.  English Estates paid for the planning appeal to get the Liverpool
City Council decision overturned, and a derelict land grant was used to reclaim the site.  The
Eldonians lobbied for the MDC expansion and their inclusion under the expanded area to get out
from under the Liverpool City Council's jurisdiction.  The Eldonians finally purchased a 12-acre
site with Merseyside Task Force money.  In 1989, Prince Charles officially opened the Eldonian
Village that consisted of 160 properties, built courtesy of Housing Corporation funds.  Phase I
had cost £6M in all.  The MDC were obvious allies for the Eldonians, as they had ideas of
expansion.
MDC's area expansion has led to an increased population (from 450 to 7,000) and the
subsequent questions of another level of accountability: the neighborhood.  The draft Vauxhall
Area Strategy was believed to reflect community concerns for affordable housing and at least
provide space for community based economic development plans (Parkinson & Dawson
1990:17).  The Eldonians had a lot of opportunity for consultation.  In fact, the initial boundary
of the extended MDC area was moved from the railway line to the Vauxhall Road on the
Eldonians request to incorporate their village. 
The Eldonian/MDC partnership appears to be a win/win situation.  The Eldonians have
been allowed to do community-led development in the Vauxhall area.  The Liverpool City
Council has been thwarted in its attempts to force municipal housing on the Vauxhall residents.
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The MDC has gained politically important local support and has met a greater portion of its
original charge by including the Eldonian housing projects.
THE DISLOCATION OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN THE US2
In the United State's decentralized federal political system, the central government transfer
of local planning and development powers is not permissible.  The national government does not
have the authority to transfer planning and development powers.  These powers belong to state
government and in fact, historically many states have relinquished some of these powers to state-
chartered local municipalities through home rule provisions.  Thus, the national government is
dependent upon state enabling legislation even to channel dollars through state and local
government to privately led quasi-public development agencies.  The buzzword is public-private
partnerships.  These organizations lead, but do not plan, redevelopment activities in the New
Orleans and the U.S. in general.  The system is much more competitive and often chaotic.
Different private corporations compete to attract public dollars to execute their private or
corporate development plans.  Here the local city councils maintain planning and development
powers, be they what they are in the U.S. (a product of state law).  In theory, it is still the local
planning agency (with some oversight by state and federal bureaucracies) and the city
bureaucracy that is left to coordinate these private corporate development projects to the
synergetic benefit of the city, its residents, and private corporations located therein. 
New Orleans, unlike many U.S. cities, did not take advantage of urban renewal and other
1960s federal programs because state and local politicians were suspicious of the 'strings' attached
to those dollars.  After Moon Landrieu became Mayor, New Orleans began to take advantage of
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federal dollars for downtown redevelopment (Whelan, Young, and Lauria 1994:6).  But since the
Board of Commissioners for the Port of New Orleans (Dock Board) controlled riverfront land
and, at that time, favored maritime use (Young and Whelan 1993:139), these redevelopment
activities occurred away from the river (e.g., Armstrong Park just north (lakeside) of the French
Quarter, the Piazza D'Italia some four blocks from the river, and the Superdome on the north end
of Poydras St., some 15 blocks from the river).  It really was not until after the 1984 World’s Fair
that redevelopment activities began to focus on the riverfront (Lauria, Whelan and Young 1994).
ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY: PUBLIC\PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
The three principal actors involved in riverfront redevelopment in New Orleans are the
Dock Board (a state agency), the Audubon Park Commission (a local, city controlled quasi-public
agency), and the City of New Orleans (a state chartered municipality).  Secondary actors include,
the Vieux Carre Commission, the Downtown Development District Board, the New Orleans
Exhibition Hall Authority, the various private corporations interested in development
opportunities, small business organizations, and local resident groups.  As will unfold later in the
local politics section of the paper, since the Dock Board has strategically decided to raise revenue
for its modernization efforts by selling or leasing its downtown riverfront property and the City
of New Orleans has decided to leave economic development planning to the private sector, the
riverfront redevelopment organizational strategy has by default or design fallen into the hand of
the quasi-public Audubon Park Commission and its private nonprofit management corporation,
the Audubon Institute.  Politically, this is a very well-insulated public/private partnership.
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The Dock Board governs the Port of New Orleans that consists of 12 miles along the
Mississippi River, facilities along the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, and the Inner Harbor
Navigation Canal.  This includes state-owned land that lies in three parishes.  The Dock Board
consists of seven members appointed by the Governor to represent those parishes: four from
Orleans Parish, two from Jefferson, and one from St. Bernard.  Since the Dock Board governs the
land along the river, any development plans must be approved and the land acquired or leased
from the Dock Board.  The Dock Board is a large state agency with over 1,000 employees and
a $50 million operating budget (Brandt and Whelan 1994:9).  
Until 1989, the Port had no dedicated source of revenue or tax base to finance capital
improvements.  Its revenues came from rents, leases, and fees.  In 1989, the Louisiana electorate
approved a one cent per gallon increase in gasoline tax to fund infrastructure improvements.  The
state transportation trustfund provided the Port with $100 million for a five-year port
improvement program (Brandt and Whelan 1994:10).  The decline of the Port, its lack of a
dedicated revenue source, and the recent rise in value of riverfront land for non-maritime uses has
convinced the Dock Board to pursue a new development strategy of capitalizing on the non-
maritime value of its downtown riverfront land through land leases and sales (although still
requiring some maritime use until the late 1980s) to finance capital improvements in port
facilities elsewhere (the uptown wharves and the Inner Harbor Navigational Canal). 
The City of New Orleans has a strong mayor, council form of government.  The Mayor
has the power to appoint department heads, initiate the budget process, authorize contracts and
veto council actions.  The council needs five out of its seven members to vote to override a
mayoral veto.  The Mayor is elected to a four-year term, but cannot succeed himself after two
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consecutive terms.  The council is also elected to four year terms; five are elected from districts
and two from the City as a whole.  
The City has an independent Planning Commission (CPC), whose nine members are
appointed by the Mayor and approved by the council.  The Commissioner's terms are staggered
and Commissioners cannot be removed without cause.  The Commission hires and fires the
Director of Planning, who serves at the pleasure of the Commission and has control over the staff,
who are civil service employees.  The CPC is not an operational agency, but rather an advisory
body.  Its major responsibility is developing and monitoring a City Comprehensive Plan and
conducting site planning reviews.  The CPC also serves as the City's Zoning Commission. 
Therefore, zoning, zoning waivers and special exceptions and its site planning reviews are
required by law to be reviewed by the Planning Commission prior to City Council action.  Like
the mayoral veto, it takes a five-member City Council vote to override any Planning Commission
recommendation. 
The Audubon Park Commission's (APC) facilities are publicly owned by the citizens of
New Orleans. The Commission consists of 24 members appointed by the Mayor of New Orleans
and approved by the City Council.  It governs Audubon Park, the Audubon Zoo, the Aquarium
of the Americas, and Woldenberg Park.  It has a five-year management contract with the
Audubon Institute (AI), a nonprofit private management company, to manage, operate, and
develop those and future facilities governed by the APC.  The APC concerns itself with the larger
or global planning issues, fundraising, and state and local political relations, not the day-to-day
operations of its facilities.  It is the land owner and must approve any AI expenditures over
$100,000, and the disposal of any APC land or any of its animal collection.  The APC has no
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staff.  The AI's staff, as part of its management contract, staffs the APC board.  The AI has a
board of directors elected from its membership (people who buy yearly passes to the Zoo and/or
the Aquarium).  Through its management contract with the APC, the AI board of directors
supervises the day-to-day operations of the APC facilities.  It has the power to hire and fire staff
and can approve expenditures of less than $100,000.  
The AI is an outgrowth of a national trend to privatize this type of municipal facility.  As
cities faced fiscal problems in the 1970s, urban zoo and parks developed zoological societies that
used user fees to upgrade their facilities and provide more and better services.  As these
employees grew to be a larger and larger component of the facility's staff, the governing
commission began to feel the need to contract out for management services and spin off their staff
into a private  nonprofit management corporation.  In New Orleans, it was viewed important to
be able to do this so as to avoid restrictive civil service regulations and be able pay the wages to
hire the most qualified persons.  Thus, in 1989, the state passed enabling legislation and the city
passed a city ordinance that allowed the APC to contract out to a private management corporation
to run its facilities.  Thus, the Friends of the Zoo dissolved and many of its board members
became board members of the new corporation: The Audubon Institute.  As the APC and the AI
have become major riverfront developers, this transformation is a further depoliticizing and
privatizing of the redevelopment arm of the City of New Orleans.
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
It is almost a cardinal rule that any discussion of redevelopment in New Orleans begin
with a discussion of the riverfront expressway controversy (Baumbach and Borah 1980, Smith
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and Keller 1983, Brooks and Young 1993).  Perhaps this is because this project and the nature
of the resulting conflict highlights the symbiotic economic and social relationship between New
Orleans' central business district and its French Quarter.  More importantly, however, this conflict
unveiled emerging factions within the New Orleans's historic social-economic-political elite (see
Smith and Keller 1983:137-139, Young and Whelan 1993:40), and revealed the moment of
decline of the city's longstanding caretaker regime (see Whalen, Young and Lauria 1994).
Perhaps most importantly for riverfront redevelopment, the defeat of the riverfront expressway
prevented further insulation of the French Quarter and the CBD from the Mississippi River just
at a time when the previous insulator (the railroad and its transit sheds) was losing its economic
justification (Baumbach, et.al. 1988).  Thus, many analysts believe that if the riverfront
expressway had been built, the French Quarter would have been severely damaged, and riverfront
redevelopment and the concomitant tourism renaissance would have been unlikely (Baumbach
and Borah 1980, Baumbach et.al. 1988, Brooks and Young 1993:253).  
The Early Years
The first redevelopment efforts near the riverfront, located at the foot of Canal Street and
the River, were completed in the late 1960s: the International Trade Mart (ITM) in 1968 and the
Rivergate Exhibition Facility in 1969.  The ITM (now called the World Trade Center) is a 33-
story office building with 520,000 square feet of office space.  It houses consulates, international
business and trade offices, federal agencies dealing with international commerce, shipping and
freight companies, international law, banking, and insurance firms, and the Dock Board
(Baumbach et.al. 1988).  The Rivergate was New Orleans' first major exhibition and convention
center.
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The riverfront expressway controversy brought potential threats to the viability of the
French Quarter to the forefront.  The Vieux Carre Demonstration Grant study, and later the
Quarterfront study, focused on relieving development pressures on the French Quarter by
proposing non-maritime development along the riverfront near the Quarter (Baumbach et.al.
1988).  At the same time, the Dock Board commissioned a study (Centroport) to evaluate the
feasibility of relocating port facilities from the downtown riverfront to the Inner Harbor
Navigation Canal and the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet.  The study concluded that such a move
would be better suited for new technological developments in cargo handling (containers),
freeway access, and expansion while freeing riverfront land for urban development.  This study
marks the beginning of the Dock Board's strategy of using the increasing land values of riverfront
land to capitalize port development elsewhere.
After the defeat of the expressway, Mayor Moon Landrieu began efforts to revitalize the
riverside portion of the French Quarter.  This included the Moonwalk, which is a 410 foot long,
12-foot-wide riverfront boardwalk adjacent to Jackson Square.  These efforts also included the
rejuvenation of the Jackson Square area, the French Market, and the Washington Artillery Park
(Baumbach et.al. 1988:9).   Later (in the mid 1980s), the Jackson Brewery would renovate and
shore-up the upriver from Jackson Square section of the riverfront with a festival marketplace
development (see Brooks, Wilkinson and Young 1984). 
The next two developments were private developments upriver of the French Quarter, a
hotel and a mixed-use commercial development: the Hilton Hotel Complex and Canal Place.  The
Hilton complex, located just upriver from the ITM, required the consolidation of 23.3 acres of
land adjacent to the Poydras Street Wharf and a lease of the Poydras Street Wharf from the Dock
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Board.  The Dock Board allowed non-maritime use above the wharf,  but required maritime use
for the wharf itself.  This became the pattern of lease developments with the Dock Board through
the mid 1980s (Young and Whelan 1993:140).  The $250 million project included a 30-story
hotel with 1,200 rooms, an attached tennis club, a 1,500-car parking garage, and an international
cruiseship passenger terminal (Baumbach et. al. 1988:10).  Phase I was completed in 1977, and
a four story, 450-room addition with a skywalk to the Poydras Street Wharf was completed in
1984.  Later developments at the site include a high rise, residential condominium building (One
River Place, the first residential use of riverfront land) and a riverboat casino (Lauria, Whelan and
Young 1984:10).  Canal Place, located on a 13-acre site on the Quarter side of Canal Street and
the River, includes a 439-room hotel, 960,000 square feet of office and retail space, and a 1,500-
car garage); Canal Place was completed in 1979.  The City and the national government were
involved with a $5 million UDAG for infrastructure improvements in the area (see Young 1984
and Lauria, Whelan and Young 1994:10).
The World’s Fair Strategy
Riverfront redevelopment really did not begin to consolidate until after the 1984 World’s
Fair Exhibition.  The fair's theme, "The World of Rivers: Fresh Walter as a Source of Life", was
meant to promote New Orleans as a world-class tourist mecca.  As the theme implied, the
riverfront was the focal point.  With more than five years of planning, the fair ran May through
November 1984.  The fair's site was chosen to shore-up the already existing but speculative
riverfront development around and on the Poydras Street Wharf (Smith and Keller, 1983:143) and
to further stimulate non-maritime riverfront development (Baumbach et.al. 1988:11).  The site
consisted of 82 acres bounded by the river, South Front, Erato and Poydras Streets.  This site was
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chosen because of pedestrian access to the French Quarter and to major hotels in the CBD as well
as to take advantage of the already planned New Orleans Convention Center.  
The riverfront development interests were strong proponents of the fair.  The fair would
transform, through public infrastructure improvements, 82 acres of riverfront into a short-term
tourist attraction with prospects of long term commercial and residential development (Smith and
Keller 1983:143).  Sixty-five of the 82 acres were leased and returned to the private and public
owners after the fair: $88.3 million to the Exhibition Hall Authority for the 15-acre convention
center, $14 million to the Dock Board for the covered wharves needed by the fair, and small
property owners in the Warehouse District adjacent to the riverfront property (Baumbach et.al.
1988:12).  The fair's sponsors were partially insured against risk by the state government, much
of the development costs was paid for with public monies and Governor Treen agreed that the
state would absorb the first $5 million of any fair deficits.  The fair's sponsors claimed that it
would create 14,000 short-term jobs, 39,000 total jobs and $2 billion in economic benefit to the
regional economy (Smith and Keller 1983:143).  
Although the fair was a financial disaster ($100 million deficit) and many small
businesses associated with it went bankrupt, socially, the fair was a spectacular  success,  and
ideologically and symbolically, it paved the way for the success of the existing but speculative
developments and future riverfront developments. According to Baumbach et.al. (1988:12), 
... it was not until the opening of the New Orleans' World's Fair in May 1984 that
the city truly reunited with the river.  For the first time since the covering of the
wharves in 1905, the city was physically visually, and psychologically linked with
its riverfront. The 1984 World's Fair dramatized the vast potential of the river's
edge.
Also, after the dramatic financial fiasco settled, the fair was credited with many positive residual
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effects (see Tews 1986, Lauria, Whelan, and Young  1995, McClain 1994).
As indicated, the fair provided the first tenant for the New Orleans Convention Center,
the original building on a 15-acre site containing 820,000 square feet of which 381,000 square
feet was exhibit space.  As with most public developments in the U.S. at this time, it required a
complex financial package: $17.8 million in federal dollars, $30 million in state dollars, and
$48.5 million in Exhibition Hall Authority revenue bonds supported by a 2% hotel-motel tax.
A later addition doubled the exhibit space and added more meeting rooms and a larger ballroom.
The Convention Center is slated for another expansion to more than a million square feet in
exhibit space in the 1990s.  At the same time, the number of hotels almost doubled between 1975
and 1985: 10,686 to 19,500 (Brooks and Young 1993:262).  Not surprisingly, it is now claimed
the New Orleans can compete with other major U.S. cities in terms of convention and hotel space
and can certainly out compete most, in terms of extra convention entertainment activities. The
Convention held 104 events that attracted 405,334 participants in 1993. Over 23,000 jobs in the
local economy have been attributed to the activities of the Convention Center.  The Exhibition
Hall Authority estimates that $9.3 billion dollars have circulated in New Orleans due to the
activities of the Convention Center (Lauria, Whelan and Young 1994:11).
The second major project to come out of the 1984 World's Fair is Rouse’s $55 million
Riverwalk festival marketplace development that opened in the fall of 1986.  The City acquired
an $8 million low-interest UDAG loan to help Rouse redevelop part of the World’s Fair site.  The
development extends for approximately a half of a mile between Poydras and Julia Streets.  It
occupies a portion of three former Dock Board wharves.  The Riverwalk has 180,000 square feet
of restaurants, shops, small eating places and small boutiques (Baumbach et.al. 1988:16).
29
Approximately 2,300 people are employed, and an average of 23,000 persons visit the Riverwalk
daily (Lauria, Whelan and Young 1994:13).  In addition, Rouse used part of the UDAG to restore
the Spanish Plaza (a gift from the Spanish government to the people of New Orleans to
commemorate Spanish history in the city).  The Plaza links Canal and Poydras Streets at the River
and is the embarkation point for river cruise vessels: The President, Creole Queen, the Zoo
Cruise, and The Queen of New Orleans (now The Flamingo), the first gaming riverboat in the
downtown area.  The Plaza offers outdoor dinning, a sidewalk cafe, and an outdoor stage that
hosts special music events with the River as a backdrop.  
The third major impact the fair had on the area was off the river in the Warehouse district.
It is clear that the improvements made for the fair helped accelerate the Warehouse district's
transformation into a residential neighborhood and cultural area.  Since 1984, at least 10 historic
buildings have been renovated for residential use: there are approximately 1,036 apartments with
over 2,500 residents now (Lauria, Whelan and Young 1984:13).  Some of the renovation occurred
in buildings used during the fair, and much of it was financed through the tax incentive credits
of 1981.  The area has also developed into a cultural arts area with 13 galleries and several new
restaurants and night clubs.  Thus, the area adjacent to what was riverfront wharves, and now is
either the Convention Center, the Rouse Riverwalk or the Hilton Complex , was transformed from
underutilized warehouses into a thriving inner city residential, cultural, and entertainment
enclave, spurred on by the tourist developments along the river and the labor market in the CBD.
Riverfront 2000 and the Audubon Institute
The successful riverfront development, the activities associated with the World's fair, and
the urban Aquarium as a tourist attraction craze that swept the U.S. (e.g., Boston, Baltimore) gave
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the Audubon Park Commission the idea that a riverfront aquarium located near the Quarter and
the CBD would be very successful in New Orleans.  The APC presented the idea to the City and
a feasibility study was conducted in 1985 (Baumbach et. al 1988:23).  The aquarium was sold to
the public based on its success elsewhere in the U.S. and on its contributing to the missing family
component of the New Orleans tourism base.  The only controversy was that the suggested
location was perceived as another threat to the French Quarter.  The fear was that the increased
tourist pressure (success) would transform the authentic French Quarter into something like
another Disney adventure.  The location held that the Aquarium of the Americas and Woldenberg
Park were built along the riverfront from Canal Street into the Quarter to Jackson Square.  The
Aquarium was to be built on the Bienville Wharf and the Park would extend for 16 acres toward
the square.  The city owned part of the land, and the Dock Board agreed for the first time for a
completely non-maritime use of a mothballed wharf.  In November of 1986,  New Orleans voters
agreed to provide $25 million bond issue of the $40 million dollar project.  The additional $15
million was to be raised privately.  
It was the future addition of the Aquarium to the facilities of the APC that led to their
request for enabling legislation that would allow them to contract out to a private nonprofit
management corporation.  Thus, the Audubon Institute was born.  The Aquarium was completed
on schedule in the fall of 1990, and it has been very successful, exceeding all attendance
expectations, while the park has been used often for special events (e.g., the French Quarter
Festival, the Tomato Festival, July 4th,  to name a few).  At the same time, according to many
local French Quarter aficionados and the Quarter’s resident association, the increased tourist
pressure has begun to take its toll.
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Shortly after the opening success of the Aquarium, the Audubon Institute presented to the
City its Riverfront 2000.  Not a comprehensive plan in a sense, but rather a proposal for a series
of riverfront projects adjacent to the French Quarter: expansion of Woldenberg Park, an
insectarium and a museum.  Riverfront 2000 also includes the third phase of the Convention
Center expansion and the construction of a new facility for the New Orleans Center for the
Creative Arts (NOCCA), a part-time high school for talented artists and musicians, in the
Marigny further downriver.  The Audubon Institute proposed that this project be funded with
another city and state bond issue, a hotel tax, and private contributions (Lauria, Whelan and
Young 1994:15).  Although the Audubon Institute's proposal was never accepted by the City
Council, but the Audubon Institute is proceeding with its preparatory work, the state legislature
has approved the financing for the third phase of the Convention Center expansion, NOCCA has
acquired the site in Marigny for its new facilities, with ground breaking expected soon.  The
battle lines are drawn around the Esplanade Avenue anchor: the insectarium and museum.  A
third party proposed a gaming boat at the Esplanade Wharf, but the Dock Board has recently
(1994) ruled it out due to the dangerous curve in the River near the wharf. 
The last, but certainly not least, development along or near the riverfront is that of
gaming.  In 1991, the state legislature authorized riverboat gambling.  There are five boats slated
for the downtown riverfront.  One, as mentioned, is already in place at the Poydras Street Wharf.
The other four have been proposed in many places, two along the quarter riverfront at Jax
Brewery and the Esplanade Wharf.  The others have been moving up and down the uptown side
of the Canal Street, from Poydras Street to the Mississippi River Bridge.  The major location
problem appears to be a combination of some boat companies wanting agglomeration (three boats
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side by side) and the lack of parking available.  It is not clear at this date where these boats will
be docked, but there is much pressure to keep them off the Quarter riverfront.
In 1992, the state legislature, under political pressure from Governor Edwards, authorized
a land-based casino on the site of the Rivergate convention center at the foot of Canal Street.
This is an intriguing story and the intrigue is not over, but it is clear that a land-based casino is
to be built by Harrahs on the Rivergate site sometime in the mid 1990s.  Already there has been
a land grab in the areas upriver of the Rivergate and inland from the riverfront in the Warehouse
district.  Five separate hotels are in the planning stages with moore than 1,000 additional rooms.
The impact of the casino and related uses is of major concern of the Quarter and Warehouse
district residents.  Already, the land uses in the first two blocks of the French Quarter off Canal
Street are changing dramatically: witness the new House of Blues on Decatur Street.   At the
same time, residents have successfully fought off a proposed Vegas-type entertainment spot near
the Convention Center.
Summary
If one looks downriver from the Mississippi River Bridge, almost all of the maritime
wharves have been transformed into mixed-maritime/tourist or non-maritime/tourist use: The
New Orleans Convention Center abuts the Rouse Riverwalk which adjoins the Hilton's
International Rivercenter Complex, which is adjacent to the World Trade Center and adjoins the
Spanish Plaza which merges with the Ferry Terminal, then the Aquarium of the Americas,
Woldenberg Park, Jax Brewery and the Moonwalk, followed by some undeveloped levee and the
Esplanade Wharf (both of which are scheduled for redevelopment by the Audubon Institute's
Riverfront 2000 plan into a continuation of Woldenberg Park and an Insectarium respectively).
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This is all connected by the riverfront trolley line.   Next comes the turn in the river that prevents
one from seeing  the working wharves along the Marigny and the Bywater neighborhoods to the
Industrial Canal.
Thus, for over 30 years the riverfront in New Orleans has been transformed from working
wharves into a commercial/tourist/recreational riverfront.  This began with the decline of the port
and its wharves and rail facilities primarily due to a lack of capital financing mechanism for
modernization (see Young and Whelan 1993).  It was followed by a Dock Board redevelopment
strategy that slowly transformed from protecting maritime use only.  The rise in potential
riverfront land value for non-maritime uses combined with the lack of dollars needed for port
modernization convinced the Dock Board to allow negotiated mixed use development.  Finally,
the Dock Board decided to take advantage of this potential land value differential and lease and
sell downtown riverfront land for non-maritime uses to finance port modernization elsewhere:
with the provision that suitable maritime wharves and facilities be developed elsewhere and after
a community-based master plan has been developed for the riverfront land (Brooks and Young
1993:266-267).
LOCAL POLITICS AND THE DISLOCATION
Riverfront redevelopment in the U.S. has faced some serious challenges, not the least of
which has been the politics associated with jurisdictional fragmentation (see Young and Whelan
1993, Brandt and Whelan 1994).  New Orleans has numerous boards, commissions, and special
districts that are not directly accountable to its citizens or controlled by their local representatives,
the Mayor or the City Council; the important ones for our story are the Dock Board and the
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Audubon Park Commission and its contractee, the Audubon Institute.  Riverfront redevelopment
is also a subset of land-based urban development in general; thus, it is subject to the uncertainties
of the locality's governing regime.  This is the heart of the dislocation of planning and
development powers to be discussed here.  Although the story has been told in detail elsewhere
(see Whelan 1987, Whelan and Young 1991,  Whelan, Young and Lauria 1994, and Cook and
Lauria 1995), it is instructive to discuss how it pertains to these riverfront redevelopment efforts.
Prior to the Landrieu Administration in 1970, the state of Louisiana and the city viewed
federal dollars with suspicion.  They did not want the federal government meddling in state and
local affairs, and they were specifically concerned with what an influx of federal dollars would
do to the politics of maintaining the state and local governing coalition.  Landrieu realized that
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 had changed the nature and
potential  of  the local caretaker regime's electoral coalition.  He realized that he could incorporate
blacks into the electoral coalition with federal dollars without antagonizing the traditional
caretaker component of the local governing coalition.  Although Landrieu primarily used
antipoverty funds and funneled them through black political organizations (Whelan, Young, and
Lauria 1994:5), he also supported the riverfront expressway and later supported the renovation
of the French Market and Jackson Square area and developed the first non-maritime use of  the
river downtown: the Moonwalk.  
It was not until the Dutch Morial Administration that the use of federal funds for
economic development became a priority (Whelan, Young, and Lauria 1994:6).   It was this shift,
the City (Morial) taking a leadership role in economic development, that began to create problems
for the caretaker components of the governing coalition, and Morial’s support dwindled.  He was
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able to maintain the mayorship because of the black electoral coalition he had consolidated. 
It was under the Dutch Morial Administrations (1978-1986) that riverfront development
was consolidated.  Under Morial, the Hilton Complex was completed, a UDAG was used for the
Canal Place mixed-use commercial project, the Spanish Plaza renovation and the World's Fair
were completed, the New Orleans Convention Center project was planned and approved, and
Rouse's Riverwalk negotiated.  The Morial signature here was that the City was involved in all
the planning and negotiations often in conflict with the Dock Board.  
With the withdrawal of federal dollars and the increased emphasis on private sector
leverage of federal economic development dollars, Barthelemy returned the development
leadership to the private sector in general, and, in particular, by encouraging the growth and
development of quasi-public development organizations (Whelan, Young, and Lauria 1994): the
Audubon Park Commission's creation of the Audubon Institute. Caught in the historical conflicts
with the Dock Board over the Rivergate among others (see Young and Whelan 1993), Barthelemy
retreated and purposively dislocated riverfront redevelopment planning to Audubon Institute.
The Audubon Institute produced the magnificent success story of the Aquarium of the
Americas/Woldenberg Park and had other grandiose plans for the French Quarter riverfront
embodied in Riverfront 2000.
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
Although their organizational strategies differ, both countries have moved toward
privately led redevelopment activities.  In the centralized political system of the UK, this took the
form of creating national corporations geographically circumscribed in local communities and
36
transferring planning and development powers and responsibilities from the local councils to
these corporations.  These urban development corporations, although public agencies, were
privately led and emphasized the leverage of private dollars with the public subsidies that they
channeled.  These UDCs planned and implemented the development activities; most central
government economic development dollars were exclusively channeled through them.  Thus, the
UDCs directly supplant the local council politically and its bureaucracy technically.  
On the other hand, in the decentralized federal political system in the U.S., the central
government transfer was not possible.  The national government does not have the authority to
transfer planning and development powers.  These powers belong to the state level of government
and in fact, historically many states have relinquished some of these powers to the local
governments through home rule provisions.  Thus, the federal government in the U.S. is
dependent upon state level enabling legislation even to channel dollars through state and local
government to privately led quasi-public development agencies.  The buzzword was public-
private partnerships.  These organizations lead, but do not plan, redevelopment activities in the
New Orleans and the U.S. in general.  The system is much more competitive and chaotic.
Different private corporations compete to attract public dollars to execute their private or
corporate development plans.  Here the local city councils maintain planning and development
powers.  In theory, it is still the local planning agency (with some oversight by state and federal
bureaucracies) and the city bureaucracy that are left to coordinate these private corporate
development projects to the synergetic benefit of the city, its residents, and private corporations
located therein.  In practice, the local councils find themselves either in a coerced position to
accept whatever proposals that come before them or risk the political fallout of doing nothing to
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help the city develop and of not taking advantage of (attracting) state and federal dollars that
promote development.  Often they find that they must use or create quasi-public development
agencies to promote and/or carry out development in order to avoid the politics of close public
scrutiny.
The two localities' development strategies were remarkably similar: tourism and
boosterism.  Although in Liverpool, the UDC had a more diversified strategy, including small
business development, and later housing through the Eldonians.  The International Garden
Festival, the Albert Dock, and the Tall Ships Race are remarkably similar to the World's Fair, the
Riverwalk, the Moonwalk, and the Jackson Brewery.  
 Finally, although the political implications are also strikingly similar—the isolation of
economic development planning and implementation from local public accountability, the policy
implications vary greatly.  In the U.K., except working politically to regain planning and
development powers in their localities, local councils must plan around the local UDC's plans:
augment their plans, fill the holes, and do what they are not doing.  In the U.S., local politicians
and planners either become obstructionists or deal makers: using the planning and development
powers that they do possess.  The peculiar feeling I have is that things are so remarkably similar.
It makes me wonder whether, perhaps, there is more truth to the structuralist position than we like
to think (see also Fainstein, Gordon and Harloe 1992, Fainstein 1994, DiGaetano and Klemanski
1993).
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1. The case study of the Merseyside Development Corporation was
conducted by second year MCD students in the Department of
Civic Design, University of Liverpool in Fall 1992.  The
students were Guy Currey, Steven Daniels, Ruth Farrow,
Jonathon Francis, Gareth Griffiths, James Hall, Gareth
Jones, Andrea McGuinness, Matt Mulderrig, Gareth Potts,
Russell Poulton, and Liz Wood-Griffiths.  I supervised the
class project during as part of the Department of Civic
Design, University of Liverpool - College of Urban and
Public Affairs, University of New Orleans Exchange
Agreement.  The students used a case study research design
(see Yin 1984).  Following their case study protocols, they
systematically evaluated local media sources, the House of
Commons Debates and Papers, local authority planning
documents, MDC documents where available, and secondary
sources.  They interviewed MDC employees, local planners,
local politicians, and local community organizations.
2. Notwithstanding a few interviews and some local newspaper
accounts, this case is constructed from secondary sources
(see Baumbach and Borah 1980, Baumbach et.al. 1988, Brandt
and Whelan 1994; Brooks and Young 1993, Cook and Lauria
1995, Lauria, Whelan and Young 1995, Smith and Keller 1983,
Whelan 1987, Whelan and Dupont 1986, Whelan and Young 1991,
Whelan, Young and Lauria 1994, Young 1984, and Young and
Whelan 1993). 
ENDNOTES
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